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Abstract
The duration of the VC incubation period is an important parameter for the profitability of venture capital (VC) firms.
This paper uses a new database of VC-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) that are listed on French financial markets
in order to highlight the importance of chief executive officer (CEO) human capital on the duration of the VC
incubation period prior to the IPO. By using a duration model (Weibull model) we find that while CEOs' previous
academic, technical and managerial experiences seem not to affect the timing of an IPO, the CEOs' entrepreneurial
background is strongly negatively correlated to the duration of VC investment (it increases the hazard ratio by more
than 100%) and thus fosters IPO exit.
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1 Introduction 
Previous literature suggests that access to VC and the human capital of the CEO are two key 
drivers for the success of new technology-based firms (Colombo and Grilli, 2010). Indeed, since 
the 1990s, VC firms have played a major role in the financing of new high-technology firms. 
From this perspective, having a strong private equity market is a key factor for the economic 
growth of countries. According to data from France Invest (the French equivalent of the 
European Venture Capital Association), French private equity firms raised 18.7 billion euros in 
2018, making it one of the largest markets in Europe. Apart from their financing role, VC 
investors are also able to both select companies and to enhance their performance (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004). Several studies have documented the contribution of VC investors to the 
professionalization of firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), better performance (see, among others: 
Jain and Kini, 1995; 2000; Bertoni et al., 2013) and the guarantee of quality at IPO (Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991). The strength of VC firms rests on a combination of the provision of money, 
management support, and monitoring (Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza et al., 1996).  
 
A CEO’s human capital is an essential part of the strategy for VC firms. First, as previous 
studies have already shown, general management competencies and the industry-specific 
entrepreneurial experience of company founders are important selection criteria for these 
investors (Bertoni et al., 2011). The experience and skills of the ventures’ top management team 
appear to have an impact both on the probability of receiving financing and on the amounts 
raised (see among others: Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Baum and 
Silverman 2004; Shane and Stuart, 2002; Patzelt, 2010; Hoenig and Haenkel, 2015). A CEO’s 
entrepreneurial background also increases the probability of financing through syndication 
(Zhang, 2018). In turn, because the management of CEO competencies is a strategic driver that 
can be used by a VC firm in order to increase the profitability of the deal, VC firms can decide 
to replace the CEO. For instance Gerasymenko et al. (2015) analyzes CEO replacement by 
venture capitalists in the early stage of development of the companies and shows that it is related 
to both better VC involvement and performance of the VC-backed company. 
 
VC firms aim to maximize their profitability. On this ground, an important but scarce resource 
for VC firms is time (Sorensen, 2007). Hsu (2013) shows that the length of the incubation period 
constitutes an intangible form of capital that creates value and has a positive impact on the VC-
backed company’s post-IPO performance. Moreover, because VC firms calculate their 
expected return on the basis of the target venture's financial statements and the PER (price-
earning ratio) that the company might generate, the rate of return for a VC deal depends 
conjointly upon the profitability of the deal and the time that is needed to achieve it. It follows 
that venture capitalists are concerned with how much they will cash out and also with how long 
they will need to hold their portfolio investment before exiting (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; 
Gerasymenko and Arthurs, 2014). Indeed, VC firms have to stay long enough in order to add 
value to the companies but they also must return cash to investors. In this sense, VC firms often 
have an incentive to exit early (Gompers, 1996). Thus, we can imagine that VC firms try to 
minimize their investment duration in the private firms without neglecting their contribution to 
the companies. There is therefore time pressure for the IPO. According to Giot 
and Schwienbacher (2007, p.679), “as time flows, VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased 
likelihood of exiting to an IPO. However, after having reached a plateau, non-exited 
investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time increases”. Furthermore, as explained 
by Hsu (2013, p.38), “[…] shorter incubation periods reflect VCs' abilities to quickly exit 
investments; this ability to accelerate the investment process allows VCs to make and exit more 
 investments, creating more IPOs in their portfolios and potentially generating greater total 
returns for LPs at the fund level. In this case, LPs1 could prefer to invest in VCs after shorter 
incubation periods”. 
 
Therefore, it is important to understand both the factors that influence VC investment duration 
and the timing of the IPO. The time dimension of the profitability of VC deals has received 
limited attention in prior studies. Cumming and Johan (2010), and Hsu (2013) investigate this 
question, but only by considering variables that are mainly related to industry, sector, or 
characteristics of companies and VC firms in the US and Canada. However, to our knowledge, 
no empirical study has yet focused on the impact of a CEO’s human capital on the duration of 
VC deals.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the database and 
methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 3, followed by the concluding 
remarks in Section 4. 
 
2 Data and methodology 
 
The sample includes French IPOs that were floated on the main and second-tier markets over 
the period 1996-20062. Our preliminary list of IPOs was obtained from the Euronext files and 
was augmented by additional data that were manually collected from Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers (AMF) publications that contain companies’ listing prospectuses and annual reports.  
 
VC firms were identified from various sources: European Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA), Association Française des Investisseurs pour la Croissance (AFIC), 
venture capitalists’ websites, and Les Echos. Similar to the methodologies used by Coakley et 
al. (2007), from the original list of more than 600 IPOs in the period 1996–2006, we excluded 
investment trusts, financial companies, building societies, transfers from other stock markets or 
market tiers, foreign-incorporated companies, de-mergers or equity reorganizations, and 
registrations at the time of a relisting following the temporary suspension of a firm. This 
resulted in a final sample of 122 entrepreneurial VC-backed IPOs in France for which we have 
all the information required for this analysis. In this paper, our main independent variables are 
defined to assess the human characteristics of the CEO. We consider here the experience and 
education of the latest CEO running the company before the IPO. In our sample, we have 28 
observations where the CEO has been replaced before IPO, among which there are only 9 cases 
where the incumbent CEO has been replaced by a new CEO who was not a founder of the 
company3.  
 
Following Cumming and Johan (2010), we employ a hazard model which is standard procedure 
for dealing with duration data. In our case, the hazard rate is the probability that the firm leaves 
its pre-IPO VC financing state and goes public at a particular point in time. The dependent 
variable is the time lapse between the date of the first VC financing and the date of the IPO 
(measured in months). In this study, we employ a parametric (Weibull) model, selected on 
maximum likelihood and minimum AIC criteria.  
 
                                                          
1
 Limited Partners.  
2
 We excluded firms issued on the Premier Marché in order to avoid a sample dispersion that was too broad.   
3
 In the 19 other cases, the new CEO was one of the founder of the company. 
 As described by Jenkins (2005), a basic concept when analyzing survival times is the hazard 
function h(t), which is the conditional failure rate defined as the probability of exit during a 
very short time interval, assuming the firm has survived up to the beginning of that interval. 
The hazard function is defined as the probability density function and the cumulative 
distribution function. The hazard function is given by: 
 ℎሺ�ሻ = �ሺ�ሻܵሺ�ሻ = lim��⟶଴Pr⁡ሺ� < ܶ ≤ � + ��|ܶ > �ሻ��  
 
where Δt is a very short time interval. This conditional probability is the probability that exit 
occurs in the time interval [t ; t + Δt], based on no exit before the beginning of time t. 
The hazard function of a firm i is expressed as:  ℎሺ�|��⁡ሻ = ℎ଴⁡ሺtሻexp⁡ሺ����ሻ 
 
In this expression, ℎ଴ሺ�ሻ is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function reflecting the 
probability of failure conditional on the firm having survived until time t after its IPO and exp(.) 
is the exponential function. 
The Weibull model assumes a baseline hazard of the form: ℎ଴ሺ�ሻ = ���−ଵexp⁡ሺ�଴ሻ, where p is 
the shape parameter. Thus, the Weibull model is specified as:  
 ℎሺ�|��⁡ሻ = ���−ଵexp⁡ሺ�଴ + ����ሻ 
 
The Weibull distribution can provide a variety of monotonically increasing or decreasing shapes 
of the hazard function. The hazard rate either rises monotonically with time (p > 1), falls 
monotonically with time (p < 1), or is constant p=1 (that is the special case of the Weibull model 
known as the Exponential model)4. 
 
We test the robustness of our estimations using a Cox proportional hazard semi-parametric 
model (Cox, 1972; Jenkins, 2005). The two models deliver very similar results, which is a good 
indicator of the robustness of our estimations. Results for the Cox model are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the independent variables and the descriptive statistics for the entire sample5. 
Concerning the characteristics of VC firms, we see that VC firms are typically around 13 years 
old at their first investment with a proportion of captive versus independent VC firms that is 
quite similar. We find also that VC-backed companies are typically around 6 years old when 
they receive their first VC financing, with 55% of them being financed in the first 3 years of 
their existence.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 For more details, see Jenkins (2005).   
5 Table 5 in Appendix 2 presents the correlations between the model variables. 
 Table 1: Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
The distribution of the IPO dates of the firms (Figure 1) shows that most of them went public 
in the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. This is not surprising given that these years constituted the 
hot issue market period in France.   
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max 
Market conditions      
IPO bubble 1 if the first VC investment was during the hot 
issue market period of 1998, 1999 or 2000, 0 
if not 
0.402 0.492 0 1 
IPO hot issue 1 if the IPO was during the hot issue market 
period 1998, 1999, or 2000, 0 if not 
0.533 0.501 0 1 
Market return The stock index return in the 3 months prior 
to exit (CAC All tradable - ex SBF 250) 
6.290 8.020 -11.829 28.074 
Fund growth The percentage change in the funds raised by 
the VC sector in the year of IPO 
106.313 143.193 -88.465 410.340 
 
VC characteristics 
     
VC age Age of the lead VC at first VC investment (in 
years) 
13.19 11.53 0 58 
VC number Number of VC firms involved in the financing 3.148 2.188 1 11 
Captive VC 1 if the lead VC firm is captive (bank, 
corporate or government affiliated), 0 if not 
0.541 0.500 0 1 
VC reputation 1 if the number of IPOs the lead VC firm has 
backed in the sample is higher than the 
average number of IPOs backed by VC firms 
in the sample, and 0 otherwise 
 
0.533 0.501 0 1 
Firm characteristics      
Firm age Age of the financed firm at the first VC 
investment (in years) 
5.992 7.830 0 45 
Patent 1 if the firm holds at least 1 patent at the date 
of IPO, 0 if not 
0.287 0.454 0 1 
Early stage 1 if the first VC investment was within the 2 
years after the company was established, 0 if 
not 
0.361 0.482 0 1 
Firm size The number of employees of the firm the year 
before the IPO 
211.451 443.621 8 4105 
Firm past 
performance 
 
Revenue/assets (for the year before the IPO) 1.077 0.765 0.003 5.617 
CEO human capital      
CEO age Age of CEO at IPO (years) 45.29 8.92 28 71 
CEO experience 
within the firm 
Number of years the CEO had been managing 
the company at first VC investment 
3.098 4.831 0 23 
CEO Exp.: 
Entrepreneurial 
1 if the CEO has created a former venture, 0 
if not 
0.270 0.446 0 1 
CEO Exp.: 
Managerial 
1 if the CEO occupied a prior managerial 
position in a company, 0 if not 
0.459 0.500 0 1 
CEO Exp.: 
Technical   
1 if the CEO has previous technical work 
experience in the same sector as the company, 0 if 
not 
0.533 0.501 0 1 
CEO School: 
Sciences 
1 if the CEO’s academic education is in the 
sciences, 0 if not 
0.557 0.499 0 1 
CEO School: 
Management 
1 if the CEO’s academic education is in 
management, 0 if not 
0.057 0.234 0 1 
 Figure 1: Distribution of the number of IPOs for the 122 firms in our sample 
 
 
 
Concerning the dependent variable, i.e., the duration of VC investment, we find that the mean 
VC incubation period in the sample is 3.66 years (44 months) and the median value is 3 years 
(36 months). 
 
Figure 2 gives the Kaplan-Meier non-parametric survivor function for VC-backed companies 
depending on the entrepreneurial experience of the CEO. If we compare the average duration 
of VC investment for firms managed or not by a CEO with entrepreneurial experience, we find 
that VC firms stay invested for shorter periods if the firm is managed by a CEO with an 
entrepreneurial background than if the CEO has no entrepreneurial experience. 
 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves (CEO Experience) 
 
Survival curves by CEO entrepreneurial background with: 
 (—) CEO Exp.: Entrepreneurial = 1 
 (- -) CEO Exp.: Entrepreneurial = 0 
 
It seems that the length of VC investment is also affected by one other important characteristic 
for private companies: the patenting activity of firms.  Figure 3 gives the Kaplan–Meier non-
parametric survivor function for VC-backed companies depending on the patent activity of 
firms. Here, in contrast to the result for Figure 2, we find that VC firms stay invested for longer 
periods if the firm holds at least one patent before the IPO. This positive correlation is possibly 
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 due to the fact that more innovative companies need a longer time to market their products and 
thus need a longer duration of investment.  
 
 
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survival curves (Patent activity) 
 
Survival curves by patent activity with: 
 (—) Patent = 1 
 (- -) Patent = 0 
 
 
3.2. Multivariate survival analysis 
Table 2 presents the results for the five specifications of the duration model (model 5 does not 
include the variable Firm age due to the high correlation with the variable CEO experience 
within the firm6). We report the coefficients of the variables. If the estimated coefficient is 
higher than 0, then this variable increases the hazard ratio (there is a negative correlation with 
the duration of investment), and thus, decreases the expected duration of VC investment, and 
vice versa. The Cox models presented in Appendix 1 (Table 3) deliver very similar results to 
the Weibull models, which is a good indicator of the robustness of our estimations.  
 
We can first see that the duration of VC investment is correlated to the market conditions. The 
positive and highly significant coefficients of the variables IPO bubble and IPO hot issue imply 
that the duration of the VC incubation period is shorter during stronger market conditions. This 
result is in line with prior research, which has found that the key determinants of the VCs' exit 
decisions are equity market conditions (Lerner, 1994). The reputation of VC firms is also 
correlated to the duration of the VC incubation period. Reputable VC firms stay invested for a 
longer period. This result is consistent with the idea developed by Gompers (1996) that argues 
that reputable VC firms have fewer incentives to exit early than less reputable VC firms. 
Moreover, our results suggest that there are significant differences between captive and 
independent VC firms in relation to the duration of their investment and the quality of their 
support. As found by Hsu (2013), it appears also that the duration of VC incubation period is 
positively and significantly correlated to the holding of patents. This result confirms that which 
was already obtained from the Kaplan-Meier graph (Figure 2). As explained above, this positive 
correlation is possibly due to the fact that more innovative companies need a longer time to 
market their products and, thus require a longer duration of investment.  
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 For the effect of the variables related to the CEO’s human capital, models 3, 4, and 5 confirm 
the results from Figure 1 and show that venture capitalists stay invested for a shorter period of 
time if the CEO has previous entrepreneurial experience. Model 3 shows that the hazard rate 
increases by more than 100% if the company is managed by a CEO with some entrepreneurial 
experience. Model 5 shows also that the duration of the VC participation is negatively 
correlated (but with a low hazard rate) to the past experience of the CEO within the firm. 
However, no other human capital dimensions related to general managerial/technical 
experience or CEO education seem to be correlated to the length of incubation of VC-backed 
firms.  
 
 
Table 2: Weibull regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
     
      
IPO bubble 1.219*** 1.207*** 1.238*** 1.237*** 1.231*** 
 
[0.249] [0.245] [0.265] [0.270] [0.248] 
IPO hot issue 0.844*** 0.804*** 0.789*** 0.787*** 0.775*** 
 
[0.238] [0.241] [0.250] [0.251] [0.254] 
Market return 0.005 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.010 
 
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] 
Fund growth -0.002** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
VC age 0.008 0.017* 0.019* 0.019* 0.026*** 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
VC number -0.156*** -0.132*** -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.116*** 
 
[0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.041] 
Captive VC 0.582** 0.684*** 0.569** 0.633** 0.589** 
 
[0.255] [0.250] [0.244] [0.266] [0.265] 
VC reputation  -0.506** -0.585*** -0.610*** -0.676*** 
  [0.200] [0.200] [0.200] [0.228] 
Firm age -0.035 -0.027 -0.023 -0.021 
 
 
[0.025] [0.028] [0.030] [0.030] 
 
Patent -0.685** -0.603* -0.724** -0.721** -0.573* 
 
[0.343] [0.321] [0.352] [0.344] [0.333] 
Early stage -1.160*** -1.103*** -1.222*** -1.257*** -0.852*** 
 
[0.252] [0.277] [0.282] [0.285] [0.226] 
Firm size 
  
-0.001* -0.001* -0.001 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Firm past performance 
  
-0.392** -0.384*** -0.477*** 
   
[0.153] [0.148] [0.147] 
CEO age 
 
-0.030** -0.008 -0.010 -0.026* 
  
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
CEO Exp.: Entrepreneurial 
  
0.913*** 0.878*** 0.844*** 
   
[0.268] [0.268] [0.301] 
CEO Exp.: Managerial 
  
-0.094 -0.065 0.255 
   
[0.237] [0.250] [0.256] 
CEO Exp.: Technical 
  
0.050 0.397 0.430 
   
[0.228] [0.384] [0.416] 
CEO School: Sciences 
   
-0.481 -0.465 
    
[0.480] [0.511] 
CEO School: Management 
   
-0.088 -0.205 
    
[0.320] [0.334] 
 CEO experience within the firm 
    
0.084** 
     
[0.035] 
Constant -6.228*** -5.203*** -5.994*** -5.906*** -5.947*** 
 
[0.670] [0.822] [0.829] [0.850] [0.859] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 122 122 121 121 121 
Log likelihood -118.950 -115.062 -106.084 -105.526 -102.253 
Ln_p 0.568*** 0.599*** 0.657*** 0.666*** 0.692*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models contain dummy variables for the sectors. All 
the models are significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
4 Conclusion 
Our results show that the investment strategies of venture capitalists depend, in part, on the 
entrepreneurial experience of the CEO of the VC-backed company. Thus, we are able to 
confirm here the findings of Beckman et al. (2007) regarding the positive impact of 
entrepreneurial experience on the timing of the IPO within the VC financing context. Moreover, 
our results show the relative importance of CEO experience and scholarly background in the 
VC financing context. Previous literature suggests that CEO human capital characteristics are 
key drivers of firm success, regardless of their technological profile (Gimmon and Levie, 2010; 
Cauchie and Vaillant, 2016). However, given the “coaching” function of VC, some CEO human 
capital characteristics appear to be less important here for firm achievement (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2010). Because they can be substituted at least partially by VC competencies, CEO 
scholarly profile, managerial and technical experiences have no impact on the IPO timing for 
financed companies on the financial market. 
 
It seems that VC firms save time when they invest in companies managed by a CEO with 
entrepreneurial experience – likely by reducing the cost of their “coaching” function but maybe 
also because this precise type of CEO sends a good signal to the market and therefore makes 
an IPO more likely at a sooner date.  Also, this investment strategy perhaps allows VC firms to 
manage their firm portfolios more efficiently in order to avoid the “plateau effect” described by 
Giot and Schwienbacher (2007). In that particular case, VC firms’ performance could be 
improved by investing in companies managed by a certain type of CEO during the selection 
process.  
 
This paper contributes to research on entrepreneurial finance by analyzing the human capital 
features of an important parameter of the investment strategy of VC firms, i.e. the duration of 
their investment. We find that CEO human capital matters only along specific dimensions, and 
that venture capitalists stay invested for shorter periods of time, on average, if the CEO has an 
entrepreneurial background. CEO profiles of VC-backed firms and the timing of the VC deals 
are key aspects that should be taken into account when assessing the performance of VC 
companies. Future research is needed on these topics in order to refine our knowledge of the 
VC industry. 
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Appendix 1: The Cox model 
 
The hazard function of a firm i is expressed as:  ℎሺ�|��⁡ሻ = ℎ଴⁡ሺtሻexp⁡ሺ����ሻ 
 
The Cox regression uses the proportional hazard assumption, which assumes that all groups of 
firms face a hazard function of the same shape. The shape of the hazard function remains 
unspecified and it can take any form (Jenkins, 2005). Cox proportional hazards models assume 
that the hazard ratio is constant over time. In the presence of hazards that do not satisfy the 
proportional assumption the estimates can give biased and inefficient results for all the 
parameters. 
 
We reported here the results for two models but the results for all models are available by 
request.  
 
               Table 3: Cox model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
   
        
IPO bubble 1.001*** 0.996*** 1.057*** 
 
[0.198] [0.199] [0.203] 
IPO hot issue 0.490*** 0.496*** 0.513*** 
 
[0.188] [0.188] [0.190] 
Market return 0.011 0.010 0.005 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Fund growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
VC age 0.018** 0.018** 0.020*** 
 
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
VC number -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.096*** 
 
[0.036] [0.035] [0.037] 
Captive VC 0.491** 0.504** 0.412** 
 
[0.198] [0.204] [0.189] 
Firm age -0.016 -0.017 -0.037* 
 
[0.020] [0.019] [0.020] 
Patent -0.565* -0.563** -0.437 
 
[0.290] [0.286] [0.272] 
Early stage -0.980*** -1.005*** -0.896*** 
 
[0.199] [0.198] [0.195] 
Firm size -0.000** -0.000** -0.001* 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm past performance -0.312*** -0.309*** -0.359*** 
 
[0.117] [0.119] [0.117] 
VC reputation -0.485*** -0.508*** -0.558*** 
 
[0.157] [0.161] [0.172] 
CEO age -0.004 -0.004 -0.012 
  
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] 
CEO Exp.: Entrepreneurial 0.691*** 0.696*** 0.730*** 
 
[0.197] [0.203] [0.210] 
CEO Exp.: Managerial -0.078 -0.087 0.086 
 
[0.176] [0.191] [0.188] 
CEO Exp.: Technical 0.012 0.165 0.199 
 
[0.178] [0.303] [0.318] 
CEO School.: Sciences 
 
-0.155 -0.073 
  
[0.371] [0.387] 
CEO School.: Management 
 
0.058 0.024 
  
[0.252] [0.266] 
CEO experience within the firm 
  
0.083*** 
   
[0.025] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 121 121 121 
Log likelihood -442.079 -441.934 -438.645 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 2: Correlation matrix 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
IPO bubble 1 1                    
IPO hot 
issue 2 -0.004 1 
              
 
   
Market 
Return 3 -0.210 0.299 1 
             
 
   
Fund 
growth 4 -0.086 0.232 0.165 1 
            
 
   
VC age 5 -0.149 -0.039 0.127 0.049 1                
VC number 6 0.006 0.018 -0.112 -0.006 -0.062 1               
Captive VC 7 0.017 0.192 -0.041 0.012 -0.307 -0.089 1              
Firm age 8 -0.040 -0.098 0.001 -0.127 0.081 -0.222 0.081 1             
Patent 9 -0.150 -0.024 0.075 -0.022 0.046 0.207 -0.070 -0.009 1            
Early stage 10 0.046 -0.084 -0.056 0.018 -0.081 0.239 -0.165 -0.494 0.090 1           
CEO age 11 -0.156 -0.032 0.070 -0.034 0.030 0.019 -0.008 0.321 0.025 -0.063 1          
CEO Exp.: 
Entreprene
urial 
12 0.028 -0.096 0.022 -0.060 -0.016 0.035 0.117 -0.160 -0.060 0.081 -0.213 1      
   
CEO Exp.: 
Managerial 13 0.118 -0.028 -0.053 -0.078 -0.032 -0.010 0.089 -0.229 -0.039 0.096 0.049 0.550 1 
   
 
   
CEO Exp.: 
Technical 14 -0.171 0.012 0.072 -0.091 -0.070 -0.004 0.094 -0.043 0.158 -0.049 0.008 -0.096 -0.094 1 
  
 
   
CEO 
School: 
Sciences 
15 -0.112 -0.008 0.001 -0.193 -0.148 -0.046 0.106 0.018 0.127 -0.087 0.018 -0.089 -0.073 0.786 1   
   
CEO 
School: 
Manag. 
16 0.093 -0.043 0.016 0.103 0.141 0.039 -0.053 0.054 -0.093 0.076 -0.122 0.051 0.053 -0.547 -0.726 1  
   
CEO exp. 
within the 
firm 
17 0.062 0.023 0.200 -0.075 0.043 -0.234 0.043 0.638 0.040 -0.356 0.314 -0.242 -0.326 -0.063 -0.033 0.080 1 
   
VC 
reputation 18 -0.003 0.780 0.129 0.058 0.228 0.063 0.060 -0.007 0.085 0.053 -0.155 0.015 -0.093 -0.021 -0.140 0.209 -0.049 1   
Firm size 19 -0.093 -0.104 -0.054 -0.071 0.064 -0.115 0.085 0.295 -0.134 -0.164 0.330 -0.0956 -0.074 0.023 -0.008 0.027 0.161 -0.078 1  
Firm past 
perf. 20 0.089 0.016 0.121 0.168 0.096 -0.259 0.046 0.198 
 
-0.095 
 
-0.134 0.056 -0.005 0.025 0.029 -0.068 -0.031 0.213 0.049 0.030 1 
Variables significant at 1% are in bold letters. 
